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MAY-JUNE, 1961
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF EVIDENCE
By WALTER L. GERASH*
Many interesting problems in the law of evidence were con-
sidered by the Colorado Supreme Court among the important de-
cisions of that court in 1960. To the extent possible, the cases are
here divided into civil and criminal groupings.
I. CIVIL CASES
A. Examination and Cross-Examination of Witnesses
In Van Hise v. Trino,1 plaintiff in error claimed that the court
below erred when her counsel was not allowed to cross-examine
her on matter covered in direct examination. She was first called
as an adverse witness under Rule 43(b) of the Colorado Rules of
Civil Procedure by the opposing party. The court held that counsel
can cross-examine his own party if she is called initially for "cross-
examination under the rules." Although its denial was error in this
case, it was not prejudicial and reversible since the same matter
was covered when the witness-party testified in her own behalf in
her case-in-chief.
B. Opinion Evidence and Experts
There were several decisions that shed further light on who
may give an opinion on subject matter involved in a trial. In Ken-
dall v. Hargrave,2 plaintiff sued in tort for personal injuries and
damage to her automobile. She recovered only for property dam-
age, which was the exact amount stipulated by the parties. On er-
ror, the issue was whether the lay plaintiff could testify as to the
sums paid by her for medical treatment. The court not only an-
swered in the affirmative, but also held that the amounts testified
to were admissible to show some evidence of their reasonable value.
The witness can answer yes or no as to whether she has knowledge
of the amounts paid the doctors. What doctor bills are reasonable
are for doctors to decide.
In this same case, the high court invoked Rule 111 (f) of the
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure in order to do justice to a liti-
gant. This rule allows the court, in its discretion, to notice any error
appearing of record although such error was not raised by writ of
error. Below, no instructions were given on the types of general
damages. The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court should
have so instructed, on its own motion, even though such instruction
was not tendered by the parties.
In Hoffman v. Brown,3 the general rule was affirmed as to who
is an expert; namely, it is up to the discretion of the trial court.
The court held that the value of damages to furnishings concerns
universal things and the "layman" who has experience in such mat-
ters may testify.
In Dandrea v. Board of County Comm'rs,4 plaintiff asked for
$100,000 damages and received $10. Plaintiff's claim was based on
* Mr. Gerash is a Denver attorney and a member of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations.
1 352 P.2d 284 (Colo. 1960).
2 349 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1960).
. 354 P.2d 599 (Colo. 1960).
4 356 P.2d 893 (Colo. 1960).
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damage to property due to a change in the grade of a road. The
high court affirmed the decision and stated that the damage test
is the difference between the reasonable market value of the prop-
erty before and after impairment. The court ruled that plaintiff
merely proved the cost of bringing his property to the level of the
highway. Further, it stated that plaintiff's expert witness expressed
"opinion buttressed by assumed facts at variance with actual facts
[and] has no evidential efficacy." In another case,5 the court noted
that if an expert testifies, there should be an expert witness in-
struction.
C. The Parol Evidence Rule
The parol evidence rule and its classical exceptions were in-
terpreted in five cases. Since the rule is a part of the substantive
law of contracts, comment will be limited.
In Witherspoon v. Pusch,6 seller brought suit for breach of con-
tract and on a $7,500 check, upon which payment had been stopped.
Parol testimony was admitted to show there was no contract at all.
Evidence showed that the real estate option contract did not em-
brace a firm offer, as the buyer's check Was to be held until further
investigation of the property.
Von Risen v. Greeley Finance Co.7 affirms one of the excep-
tions to the parol evidence rule by holding that if a writing is a
mere note or memorandum of the agreement between the parties,
it can be explained by parol evidence.
In Arch A. Edwards Post No. 252 v. Gould," plaintiff sought to
have a deed absolute on its face declared a mortgage. While parol
evidence can be introduced to show that such a deed was in fact a
mortgage transaction, the burden of proof must be by clear and
convincing evidence. Disparity between offer and selling price,
$210,000 and $72,214.33 respectively, was held to be insufficient to
sustain the burden of proof.
The parol evidence rule was upheld in King Collection Bureau
v. Burns.! This was an action on a promissory note by an assignee.
Summary judgment was entered for the defendant when plaintiff
attempted to plead a parol agreement in his reply. The court held
that the reply was contrary to the terms of the note, which were
clear and unambiguous.
In Marlatt v. LaGrange,10 defendants in error as plaintiffs be-
low sued to recover a deposit of $2,000 made as a down payment
on a purchase of a residence. The option contract stated:
The entire price to be paid is Eighteen Thousand Five
Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($50.00) of which the amount
as above stated is a part, and the balance ($18,450.00) to be
paid as follows: $2,000.00 in cash including the above de-
posit on or before ten days from date; Obtain maximum
loan and balance to be carried on 2nd Deed of Trust by
Seller, on or before 3 years.
The court ruled for plaintiff, holding the term "Obtain maximum
5 Sabon v. People, 350 P.2d 576 (Colo. 1960).
6 349 P.2d 137 (Colo. 1960).
7 350 P.2d 340 (Colo. 1960).
8 356 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1960).
9 354 P.2d 609 (Colo. 1960).
10 357 P.2d 927 (Colo. 1960).
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loan" is vague and indefinite. Thus, the court would entertain parol
evidence to determine the intention of the parties.
D. Presumptions, Inferences and Burden of Proof
When should a trial judge take a case from the jury and direct
a verdict for the defendant? The general rule was recently restated
in two cases" in which the court said: "It is only in the clearest of
cases, where the facts are undisputed and it is plain that all in-
telligent man can draw but one inference from them, that the ques-
tion is ever one for the court." In the same vein the court, in Drake
v. Lerner Shops,12 upheld a directed verdict rendered below against
the plaintiff-invitee. It held that a five-inch step plus the reflecting
sun from the old May Company building, with conflicting photo-
graphic evidence as to the efficacy of the warnings, was not such a
hazard and unreasonable risk of harm as to require determination
by the jury.
The plaintiffs in most civil cases still have to prove their cases
by a preponderance of the evidence.
13
When will our high court reverse a case on the weight of the
evidence? If there is a conflict in the evidence, the jury resolves
it, and unless the determination is so manifestly against the weight
of the evidence as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Supreme
Court will not interfere. Thus, in Thomas v. Davis14 the court af-
firmed the jury's special verdicts on conflicting evidence on issues
of undue influence and testamentary capacity.
In Noel v. Jones,15 the plaintiff, a patron of the defendant,
slipped and fell upon entering defendant's business establishment.
There was a judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff brought error
on two instructions. The high court held one instruction on con-
structive notice to be inconsistent and also one of the propositions
wrong. Not only was the jury instructed on plaintiff's burden to
prove by a preponderance but also that plaintiff must prove the
defect clearly and definitely. The court also held erroneous the in-
struction on intoxication on three grounds: (1) It did not connect
the intoxication with the occurrence; (2) It permitted an inference
of intoxication from one drink of alcoholic liquor; (3) It was given
as an abstract proposition of law without any application to the
facts of the case.
The court also held an instruction erroneous which attempted
to shift the burden onto respondent. 16
E. The Dead Man's Statute
One of the remaining vestiges of competency is still inexorably
applied. A surviving partner sued the executor of the deceased
partner's estate for an accounting. An accountant who was not a
party in interest testified. He based part of his testimony on a
private memorandum kept by the decedent. While the lower court
excluded the memorandum under the statute, 17 it allowed the ac-
11 Gray v. Turner, 350 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Colo. 1960); Bailey v. King Soopers, 350 P.2d 810, 811
(Colo. 1960).
12 357 P.2d 624 (Colo. 1960).
13 Superior Distrib. Corp. v. Hadden Theatre Supply Co., 356 P.2d 266 (Colo. 1960).
14 356 P.2d 963 (Colo. 1960); accord, Trenchard v. Dutton Realty Co., 347 P.2d 959 (Colo. 1960).
15 350 P.2d 815 (Colo. 1960).
16 Sabon v. People, supra note 5.
17 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 153-1-2 (1953).
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countant to testify. The court held the "Dead Man's Statute" also
applied to the accountant's testimony based on the memorandum
and reversed the ruling below.
18
One of the exceptions to the statute was discussed in Thomas v.
Davis.19 The court affirmed the allowing of beneficiaries named
in the will to testify as to the testator's mental condition since they
were called as witnesses by the caveatrix, the adverse party.
F. Privilege
In Carey v. Stopp2° the attorney-client privilege was recog-
nized, but such testimony as shown in the offer of proof was irrel-
evant in and of itself, and its exclusion was upheld.
The husband-wife privilege was given new interpretation this
year in the Sabon case.21 This was a civil case for an adjudication
of mental illness. The high court held it was not error to permit the
wife to testify in the proceeding. Justice Day, speaking for the
court, stated that the privilege is statutory2  and that it is not ap-
plicable to a mental health proceeding. (Thus, the court seemed
to be governed by considering whether the testimony was adverse
to the party invoking the privilege). It held that the wife's testi-
mony was not for or against the husband, but was merely to show
her husband's mental condition by his acts. The decision restricts
the husband-wife privilege.
G. The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions
In the Oswald case,23 a memorandum book of a deceased party
could not be used by an accountant for the basis of his testimony.
While the shop-book rule is an exception to the hearsay rule, one
of the requirements was missing-it was not a book of original en-
try. The other two requirements are that the entry must be con-
temporaneous with the event and must be done in the ordinary
course of business.
In a prior trial a certain witness testified. At a second trial both
parties stipulated and adopted this witness' prior testimony. The
court did not allow his testimony to be impeached for inconsistency,
since the witness was not present to be confronted.
24
18 Oswald v. Dawn, 354 P.2d 505 (Colo. 1960).
19 Supro note 14.
20 350 P.2d 1062 (Colo. 1960).
21 Supra note 5.
22 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 153-1-7 (1953).
23 Supra note 18.
24 Grandell v. Tyler, 355 P.2d 1091 (Colo. 1960).
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Another case 5 held that it is pure hearsay to admit a doctor's
report into evidence as an exhibit. Reports of such kind may be
used as aids in cross-examination of medical witnesses but are still
hearsay.
H. Exhibits
In Stewart v. Stout,2 6 plaintiff objected to the admission of a
diagram which was part of a traffic-accident report of an investiga-
tor. On previous cross-examination of the plaintiff, plaintiff ad-
mitted the diagram was a correct representation of the position of
the cars. Since the purpose of the diagram was to modify or cor-
rect plaintiff's free-hand drawing on the blackboard, the court al-
lowed it to be admitted for that purpose.
In Tucker v. Dixon,2 7 plaintiff below broke two teeth as she
surfaced in a pool. She struck a detached float. Defendant offered
two exhibits which were pictures of a permanent dividing line be-
tween the shallow and deep ends marked with floats which were
kept permanently in place with a rope or wire. Defendant offered
the exhibits to show the customary use of floats. The court reject-
ed the exhibits as immaterial and the high court affirmed.
I. The Court as a Fact-Finder
How long can a court sitting as a jury keep a matter under ad-
visement? Three years, eight and one-half months was deemed too
long. The court said that findings of fact and conclusions of law
could not be based on a recollection of the testimony of witnesses
and an appraisal of their credibility after so long a delay. 2
II. CRIMINAL CASES
A. Materiality and Relevancy
How far can the prosecution go to show evidence of other
crimes or offenses? A 1959 case, Stull v. People,2 9 was an excellent
treatise on the law of "similar acts." It analyzed the rules and pre-
scribed the necessary procedural fairness as follows:
1. The District Attorney should advise the court of the
purpose for which he offers such evidence.
2. If such evidence is admitted, the court should in-
struct the jury then and there of its limited purpose.
3. A renewal of No. 2 in the instructions.
4. Use "other transactions," "acts" or "conduct," not
similar crimes or similar offenses.
In spite of the above guidance, evidence of seven separate of-
fenses was shown in the trial court in the Kostal case, 30-four in
California, two in Missouri, and one in Colorado. The court re-
versed the death penalty below and granted a new trial. In the
same case, however, the court ruled that evidence of flight is rel-
evant and admissible on the question of guilt, however slight. Ac-
cordingly, evidence of the defendant's arrest in New York City was
deemed not to be error.
25 Panion v. Crichton, 355 P.2d 938 (Colo. 1960).
26 351 P.2d 938 (Colo. 1960).
27 355 P.2d 79 (Colo. 1960).
28 Hartfert v. Silvolo, 356 P.2d 133 (Colo. 1960).
29 140 Colo. 278, 344 P.2d 455 (1959).
30 Kostal v. People, 357 P.2d 70 (Colo. 1960).
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B. The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions
1. Dying Declaration.-Two defendants were charged with ag-
gravated robbery.3 1 One committed suicide while in custody. The
remaining defendant tried to introduce the statement of the de-
ceased co-defendant, which cleared the remaining defendant. The
lower court was affirmed when it held that the statement was hear-
say and not a dying declaration since the defendant testified that
the statement was made three weeks prior to the suicide. Lacking
was the requirement that the declarant be consciously aware of his
impending death.
2. Confession.-In the case of Cardoza v. People,32 defendant
pleaded guilty to murder. On appeal of a life sentence, defendant
urged that his confession through an interpreter was coerced. The
court ruled that no claim or objection was made below that the con-
fession was not voluntary and that the matter urged on error was
not raiged in defendant's motion for a new trial, but went on to rule
whether the confession was coerced. The court stated that the testi-
mony itself entirely negated any such contention.
One case33 held that the issue of a coerced confession cannot
be raised by habeas corpus but only by writ of error in Colorado.
This case is in line with the oft-repeated but unfortunate rule in
Colorado that one cannot raise constitutional issues by a writ of
habeas corpus.
3 4
In Gallegos v. People,3 5 the court carefully analyzed the con-
fession of a fourteen year old boy convicted of murder. First, it
held that although the same evidence was given first in a delin-
quency proceeding, it did not violate the Colorado statute that pro-
vides:
A disposition of any child under this article, or any
evidence given in any such case, shall not in any criminal
or other cause or proceeding whatever be lawful or proper
evidence against such child, for any purpose excepting in
subsequent cases against the same child under this arti-
cle .... 36
The court held, "It is only the evidence as introduced at the hear-
ing in the juvenile court which cannot be used against the child in
subsequent court proceedings. '3 7 Thus, nothing prevented the dis-
trict attorney from establishing the same facts by the same wit-
nesses and the same real and documentary evidence that may have
been used at the prior juvenile proceeding. It is interesting to note
that no question of former jeopardy was raised. The court went on
to decide that on the facts, the confession was voluntary.
Since the voluntariness of a confession, even on the state level,
also raises a federal issue, that of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution, it behooves
counsel to have a working knowledge of the federal practice.38
31 Wilson v. People, 354 P.2d 588 (Colo. 1960).
32 354 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1960).
33 Moore v. Tinsley, 351 P.2d 456 (Colo. 1960).
34 Rivera v. People, 128 Colo. 549, 265 P.2d 226 (1953); Hart v. Best, 119 Colo. 569, 205 P.2d
787 (1949); Scott, Post-Conviction Remedies in Colorado Criminal Cases, 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 249 (1959).
35 358 P.2d 1028 (Colo. 1960).
36 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-8-1(3) (1953).
37 Supra note 35 at 1032.
38 An excellent summary is contained in a note, 4 t. Ed. 2d 1833.
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3. Admissions.-In Hackett v. Tinsley,39 petitioner brought ha-
beas corpus for his release serving a sentence under the habitual
criminal act. He claimed there was no proof of the prior felony
convictions. The high court held that by admitting his identity and
the prior convictions from the witness stand he made a judicial ad-
mission. This was held to be a sufficient proof of the prior felonies
as required by O'Day v. People.40
C. Exhibits
So effective was demonstrative evidence in Falcon v. People41
that it wove a web of circumstances around the defendant. A bloody
T-shirt, a pair of scissors with a minute spot of blood on it, two
sheets and a pillow, a bloody green towel, a photograph of the de-
ceased showing stab wounds, combined with other indirect testi-
monial evidence, convicted defendant of second-degree murder.
D. Circumstantial Evidence
In Falcon v. People,42 the court quotes Militello v. People43 as
to what is circumstantial evidence.
A case of circumstantial evidence ... implies the weav-
ing of a fabric of known facts, which, often infinitesimal
or immaterial, or even prejudicial when considered alone,
become important only as they are tied to others, and when
so tied lead to the inevitable conclusions to facts in issue.
In Rueda v. People4  the defendant was found in possession of five
pairs of shoes identified as those taken in a burglary. The court
held that this possession itself raises a presumption of guilt of lar-
ceny or burglary unless the attending circumstances or other evi-
dence overcomes this presumption.
E. Illegal Search and Seizure
Article II, Section 18, of the Colorado Constitution still is in-
terpreted so as to allow evidence obtained as a result of an illegal
search and seizure to be admitted in a court of law.
45
A contrary trend seems to be going as the states swing over to
the federal exclusionary rule of People v. Cahan . 6 Even the federal
"silver platter doctrine" is now dead. This old doctrine held that
if state officials do the illegal searching and se'zing without the
connivance or cooperation with the federal officials, the latter may
take the ill-gotten fruit on a silver platter and introduce it into
evidence in a federal court.
47
Now, evidence obtained by state officers during a search which,
if conducted by federal officers, would have violated the defen-
dant's immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures under
the fourth amendment, is inadmissible over the defendant's timely
objection in a federal criminal trial.
39 352 P.2d 799 (Colo. 1960).
40 114 Colo. 373, 166 P.2d 789 (1946).
41 352 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1960).
42 Ibid.
43 95 Colo. 519, 37 P.2d 527 (1934).
44 348 P.2d 957 (Colo. 1960).
45 Miller v. People, 349 P.2d 685 (1960); This follows Wolf v. People, 117 Colo. 279, 187 P.2d
926 (1947), affirmed in 338 U.S. 25 and Wolf v. People, 117 Colo. 321, 187 P.2d 928 (1947).
46 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905, 50 A.L.R. 2d 513 (1955).
47 Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1948). That the doctrine no longer exists, see Rios v.
United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960) and Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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Even a guest has a sufficient property interest to bring a mo-
tion to supress due to illegal search and seizure under Rule 41 (e) .4
F. Opinion
The recent case of Johnson v. People49 follows prior Colorado
law and holds that a state of intoxication is a condition about which
a lay person may express an opinion.50
G. Self-Incrimination
Early v. People51 deals with several points of constitutional law.
One of the issues is whether a pre-arraignment mental examina-
tion and its contents given by way of testimony of the examining
doctors at the trial violates Article II, Section 18, of the Colorado
Constitution. The court held the interview was not a proceeding
where an oath was required. Since the statement was voluntary,
there was no violation of due process of law. There is a blistering
minority dissent.
H. Testimony of an Accomplice
In Mendelsohn v. People5 2 defendant was charged with four
counts of arson. One L was jointly charged. Before trial, L pleaded
guilty and was given probation. Defendant was convicted on three
counts.
The court affirmed the Colorado rule that testimony of an ac-.
complice, while it need not be corroborated, must be received with
great caution. If this testimony standing alone is relied upon for a
conviction, it must be clear and convincing and show guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. In this case, however, the court said the ac-
complice's testimony was corroborated.
48 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
49 357 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1960).
50 See Bauer v. People, 103 Colo. 449, 86 P.2d 1088 (1939); and McRae v. People, 131 Colo. 492,
286 P.2d 618 (1955).
51 352 P.2d 112 (Colo. 1960).
52 353 P.2d 587 (Colo. 1960).
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